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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
The decade of the 1990s was marked by an unusual number of financial and economic crises such as  
the attack on the European Monetary System in 1992-93, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994-95, the Asian 
crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 1998 and its spillover to Latin America.  The Turkish currency and 
banking crisis in 2001 and the recent difficulties in Argentina indicate that financial crises are still part of 
the current economic events.  In the wake of such developments, there has been a resurgence of interest in 
early warning systems that can anticipate the likely occurrence of such crises.  There is an extensive 
literature on the Asian financial crisis and early warning systems – with numerous surveys including  
Goldstein (1998), Montes (1998), McLeod and Garnaut (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Tan (1998, 
1999), Mariano, Gultekin, Ozmucur and Shabbir (1999), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), 
Richterr (2000), and Abiad (2002).  Along these lines, this paper explores the issue of constructing a 
monthly economic predictive model of currency crises in Southeast Asia through an alternative 
econometric methodology that addresses drawbacks in existing approaches.  Our methodology entails 
estimating a Markov regime switching model of exchange rate movements, with time-varying transition 
probabilities.  In this paper, we discuss the technical details involved in this approach and apply it to 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.   
 
Our approach is designed to avoid the potential misclassification in the construction of crisis dummy 
variables which other approaches (such as probit/logit and signalling) require.  Our methodology also 
addresses the serial correlations and sudden behavior inherent in crisis occurrence, identifies a set of 
reliable and observable indicators of impending currency difficulties, delivers forecast probabilities of 
future crises over multi-period forecasting horizons, and offers an empirical framework for analyzing 
contagion effects of a crisis and for improving short-run forecasts of key macroeconomic variables. 
 
The preliminary results reported in the paper are based on estimated univariate two-state Markov switching 
models of monthly percentage changes in nominal exchange rates.  Transition probabilities in the Markov 
chains are affected by deviations of the real effective exchange rate from trend, percentage changes in the 
ratio of money supply to international reserves, and percentage changes in real domestic credit. 
 
Our results indicate that the basic Markov switching model is moderately successful at identifying currency 
crisis episodes - with some success in predicting the recent crisis in Thailand and Malaysia. For all 
countries studied, exchange rate behavior can be characterized into two regimes - one with zero mean and 
low volatility in exchange rate percentage changes; and another with positive mean (currency depreciation) 
and high volatility. Real exchange rate overvaluation (relative to trend) is an important explanatory variable 
for predicting a switch from a low volatility to a high volatility period; it is correctly signed for all four 
countries and is statistically significant in the case of Malaysia and Thailand. The two other early warning 
indicators explored in our analysis - growth in real domestic credit and in money supply relative to reserves 
- showed only moderate importance, entering into the final specifications only in selected countries. The 
models proved moderately successful at sending warning signals but the results are not uniform across 
countries. For some depreciation episodes, like those in 1981 and 1984 for Thailand as well as the 1997 
crisis for both Malaysia and Thailand, the model provides strong signals, in some cases, several months in 
advance. But for other episodes, such as the 1997 crisis episodes for Indonesia and the Philippines, the 
model provides at best only weak warning signals. 
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These initial results point to future research work in various directions: 
 
• A more extensive search for macroeconomic indicators in the transition probabilities and use 
of sector indicators such as non-performing loans in the banking sector and short-term flows 
in financial markets, 
 
• Technical enhancement of the model with more states in the Markov chain (distinguishing 
conditions leading to a strong currency) and duration dependence in the transition 
probabilities, 
 
• Modeling exchange rate movements jointly with interest rates and reserves through a Markov 
regime switching VAR model, 
 
• Including key macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and output, in the individual 
country VAR models - to improve short-term forecasting , not only of a currency crisis, but 
also inflation and output, 
 
• A Markov switching VAR model combining countries into one inter-related model to analyze 
the contagion effects of a currency crisis, 
 
• Formal statistical procedures to assess the forecasting performance of the Markov switching 
model, and  
 
• Alternative econometric models such as ARCH and latent common factor dynamic models. 
 
CURRENCY CRISIS THEORY 
 
The theoretical literature on currency crises can be broken up loosely into three “generations”, delineated 
by the underlying mechanism that brings about the crisis.  The first generation focuses on “fundamentals,” 
and emphasizes the role of unsustainable government policies that are incompatible with a pegged 
exchange rate, and which eventually lead to its collapse.  The canonical model here was presented in 
Krugman (1979) , based on a government that is financing persistent budget deficits through monetization.  
This simplest of models suggests that in the period leading up to a speculative attack, one should notice a 
gradual decline in reserves.  It also suggests that budget deficits and growth in domestic credit may be 
potential early warning indicators for speculative attacks.  Extensions of the basic model look at the other 
factors that may force the government to abandon the peg.  For example, expansionary policy may lead 
directly to a worsening of the current account through a rise in import demand; the same result may occur 
indirectly through a rise in the price of nontradeables and the subsequent overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate.  Thus, the behavior of external variables such as the current account deficit and the real exchange rate 
may provide some warning regarding the vulnerability of a country to a speculative attack. 
 
Second-generation models were motivated by episodes such as the ERM crisis in 1992-93, where some of 
the countries did not seem to possess the characteristics described in first-generation models. This led 
researchers such as Obstfeld (1994) to enrich existing theories of currency crises.  The key element in 
second generation models is a recognition that there are both benefits and costs to maintaining a peg, and 
that market participant’s beliefs over whether a peg will hold or not can affect the government’s cost of 
defending it. The circularity inherent in second-generation models – that government policy is affected by 
expectations, and expectations are affected by government policy – leads to the possibility of multiple 
equilibria and self-fulfilling crises.  These second-generation models suggest that anything that affects a 
government’s decision whether to maintain a peg or not – unemployment, inflation, the amount and 
composition of debt, financial sector stability, etc. – might contain information on the likelihood of a crisis 
occurring. 
 
The third generation of currency crisis models focuses on the issue of contagion, or why the occurrence of a 
crisis in one country seems to affect the likelihood of a crisis occurring in other countries.  Masson (1998) 
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suggests three possible reasons why crises seem to come in clusters.  First, there may actually be common 
external shocks (e.g. fluctuations in world interest rates) that affect all the countries involved.  Second, 
there may be spillover effects from one country to another due to trade competitiveness effects or portfolio 
rebalancing effects.  Lastly, speculative attacks might spread from country to country merely on the basis 
of market sentiment or herding behavior.  This class of models suggests that early warning systems should 
include external variables such as LIBOR or the growth rate of trading partners; they also imply that the 
occurrence of a crisis in a trading partner or in “similar countries”  should be taken into account. 
 
 
EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 
 
Recent efforts (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Demigurc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1996 and 1998; Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998; and IMF, 1998a and 1998b) towards 
devising an early warning system for an impending financial crisis have taken two related forms.   
 
The first approach estimates a probit or logit model of the occurrence of a crisis with lagged values of early 
warning indicators as explanatory variables.  This approach requires the construction of a crisis dummy 
variable that serves as the endogenous variable in the probit or logit regression.  Classification of each 
sample time-point as being in crisis or not depends on whether or not a specific index of vulnerability or 
speculative pressure exceeds a chosen threshold.  For currency crises, the index of vulnerability is often 
based on a weighted average of the following three variables: 
 
• percentage changes in nominal exchange rates 
 
• percentage change in gross international reserves 
 
• difference in local and foreign short-term interest rates. 
 
Explanatory variables typically come from the real, financial, external and fiscal sectors of the economy. 
 
The second method uses a signalling or leading-indicator approach to get a more direct measure of the 
importance of each candidate explanatory variable.  Apart from constructing a crisis dummy variable, the 
approach also constructs binary variables from each explanatory variable – thus imputing a value of one (a 
“signal”) or zero (no signal) for each explanatory variable at each point in time in the sample – based on 
whether each variable exceeds a chosen threshold or not.  These signals are classified according to their 
ability to call a crisis: a signal is a “good signal” if a crisis does ensue within a specified period (usually 24 
months), and is a “false signal” otherwise.  Thresholds are chosen so as to strike a balance between the risk 
of having many false signals and the risk of missing many crises.  More precisely, a signal-to-noise ratio is 
computed for each explanatory variable over the sample period – as a quantitative assessment of the value 
of the variable as a crisis indicator.  This is done by classifying each observation of the binary signalling 
variable into one of the following four categories: 
 
 Crisis occurs within 24 months No crisis occurs within 24 months 
Signal A B 
No Signal C D 
 
Thresholds are then chosen to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio [A/(A+C)]/[B/(B+D)].  Based on this 
metric, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo (1998) find that the best early warning indicators for currency 
crises include exports, deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, M2/reserves, output, and equity 
prices. 
 
Whether this approach or a probit/logit approach is used, to cover a wider sample for purposes of 
estimating incidence probabilities for a crisis, many studies have been typically done on a panel of 
countries – and usually with some homogeneity assumptions about crisis behavior across countries. 
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Drawbacks in Current Approaches 
 
Despite the current popularity of these approaches, they have some drawbacks, which include the following 
(see Abiad (1999) and Mariano (1999) for a more detailed discussion): 
 
• Inadequate treatment of serial correlations inherent in the dynamics of a crisis.  Neither the 
probit/logit approach nor the signalling approach gives us information on dynamics – how 
long  crisis periods tend to last – nor do they give information about what variables affect the 
likelihood of a crisis period ending. 
 
• Artificial serial correlations may even be introduced inadvertently through the explicit manner 
in which the crisis dummy variable is constructed. Many previous studies focus  primarily on 
predicting the onset of a crisis, i.e. the first period where speculative attacks occur.  To 
achieve this in their binary crisis variable, they make use of so-called  “exclusion windows” 
which remove any crisis signals that closely follow previous crisis signals.  This procedure 
can introduce artificial serial correlations; see Abiad (1999). 
 
• Classification errors may result when constructing the crisis dummy variable (either as a false 
signal of a crisis, or a missed reading of a crisis).  Because the threshold used to delineate 
crisis periods from tranquil periods is arbitrarily chosen, misclassification of crisis episodes 
can occur.  If the threshold is too high, for example, some periods of vulnerability may not be 
picked up. 
 
• Inadequate framework for significance testing of the influence of explanatory or indicator 
variables (in the signalling approach).  Because the signalling approach is not based on an 
explicit stochastic model, there is no way it can be evaluated using formal statistical tests, and 
it is difficult to assess its performance vis-à-vis other approaches. 
 
• Possible inconsistencies in the estimation of crisis incidence probabilities because of 
heterogeneity across countries.  It is possible that the variables which are important in 
determining crisis likelihoods for one country are unimportant for another country.  And even 
if the same variables affected crisis likelihoods for all countries, the degree to which affects 
the likelihood of a crisis occuring may differ from one country to the next. 
 
 
Our Approach 
 
We apply a new early warning methodology that addresses these drawbacks.  We construct for each 
individual country a Markov switching autoregressive model that allows intercepts, lag coefficients and 
error variances to stochastically switch over time according to the value taken by a latent Markov chain 
describing the vulnerability of the country’s currency to speculative attacks.  A related work, Martinez 
(1999), also applies a Markov-switching model to speculative attacks, but the primary purpose in that paper 
was to evaluate the ability of the model in dating crisis periods and to see whether market expectations 
affected crisis probabilities.  Here the focus is on the use of the model as an early warning system.  Thus 
our predictive model of a currency crisis consists of two parts: 
 
1. A Markov chain model of the unobservable financial vulnerability of the country, say St.  We 
argue that what we observe are indicators of this latent attribute of the country.  Initially, we 
assume two states: 
 
• normal (St = 0) 
 
• vulnerable (S t = 1). 
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We further assume that this Markov chain is of order 1, with transition probabilities that are 
time-varying through dependence on observable indicator variables.  The preliminary results 
we report in this paper are based on the following indicator variables:  
 
• deviations of real effective exchange rate from trend 
 
• month-to-month percentage changes in the ratio of M2 to international reserves 
 
• month-to-month percentage changes in real domestic credit. 
 
2. A Markov regime-switching time series model of percentage changes in nominal exchange  
rates.  This model differs from standard ones in the sense that it includes the unobservable 
state variable St as an additional endogenous variable.  With the inclusion of St, we introduce 
the notion that the exchange rate dynamics behaves in a different fashion depending on 
whether financial conditions are normal (St = 0) or vulnerable to currency pressures (St = 1).  
We reflect this in our model by allowing the parameters in our time-series model to change in 
value over time, as financial conditions become normal or vulnerable. 
 
 
Our Model in Detail 
 
Let St be a two-state Markov chain of order 1 with transition probabilities pt and qt, so that at any given 
time t, St can take on two values, zero or one, according to the following probability law: 
 
 Pr(St = 0 St-1 = 0) = pt   and Pr(St = 1 St-1 = 1) = qt. 
 
Further, let  
 
 yt  = month-to-month percentage changes in nominal exchange rates, 
 
 xt = the vector of exogenous variables at time t to be used to explain  yt, 
 
 zt = the vector of exogenous variables at time t to be used as indicators of currency vulnerability, 
        which may overlap with xt. 
 
We assume also that the transition probabilities vary over time according to values of indicator variables in 
the following manner: 
 
 pt = F(zt’γ)    and    qt = F(zt’δ), 
 
where F(•) is the standard unit Gaussian cumulative distribution function. 
 
The second part of the model consists of a univariate linear model for yt: 
 
 yt  =  αSt + xt’βSt + σSt εt. 
 
In this model, the model parameters (α, β, σ) are subscripted by St – indicating that their true (unknown) 
values are shifting between two sets of possible parameter values:  (α0, β0, σo) and (α1, β1, σ1) depending 
on whether financial conditions are normal or vulnerable. 
 
The estimation procedure we use is direct maximization of the likelihood, where the likelihood function is 
calculated using an iterative process, described in detail in Hamilton (1994).  Collect all the parameters of 
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the model into a single vector θ = (α0, β0, σ0, α1, β1, σ1, γ’, δ’). Using information available up to time t, Ωt, 
we can calculate for each time t (using the iteration below) the value of );θtt js Ω=Pr( , the conditional 
probability that the tth observation was generated by regime j, for j = 1,2,…N, where N is the number of 
states (in this paper, N=2).  We will stack these conditional probabilities into an (Nx1) vector .   tt|ξˆ
 
Using the same iteration, we can also form forecasts regarding the conditional probability of being in 
regime j at time t+1, given information up to time t: );Pr( 1 θtt js Ω=+
t
, for j = 1,2,…N.  Collect these 
forecast probabilities in an (Nx1) vector .  Lastly, let tt |1ˆ +ξ η  denote the (Nx1) vector whose jth element is 
the density of yt conditional on st.   
 
The optimal inference and forecast for each date t can then be found by iterating on the following 
equations: 
   
)ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ
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ttt
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where Pt is the (NxN) transition probability matrix going from period t-1 to period t (for the 2-state model 
in this paper, Pt is the 2x2 matrix [pt  1-pt ; 1-qt  qt] ), and ° denotes element-by-element multiplication.  
Given an assumed value for the parameters, θ, and an assumed starting value for (the unconditional 
probability of s
0|1ˆξ
tˆξt at t=1), we can then iterate on the above equations to obtain values of  and   for t 
= 1,2,…T.  The log likelihood function L(θ) can be computed from these as  
t| tt |1
ˆ +ξ
∑
=
−=
T
t
ttt YXyfL
1
1 );,|(log)( θθ         
where 
)ˆ(1);,|( |1 tttttt YXyf ηξθ o′=− .   
 
One can then evaluate this at different values of θ  to find the maximum likelihood estimate.   
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Our estimates of univariate Markov switching models for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, using monthly data from 1974 to 1998, are summarized in the tables in the Appendix.  Graphs as 
well as tabulations of the calculated probabilities of a currency crisis at time t+1 given all information up to 
time t are obtained from the estimated model and are included as well.  Most of the data was sourced from 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM; real effective exchange 
rates are from J.P. Morgan. 
 
The estimated models are simple mean-switching and variance-switching models of month-to-month 
percentage changes in nominal exchange rates, with transition probabilities in the Markov chain depending 
on deviations of real effective exchange rate from trend, year-on-year percentage changes in the ratio of 
money supply (M2) to gross international reserves, and year-on-year percentage changes in real domestic 
credit.  These are the three variables that the IMF (1998b) found were the best early warning indicators 
among the dozens of potential candidates.  The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to calculate trends in REER.  
Graphs of these early warning indicator for the four countries are shown on Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7.  The 
expected signs on the γ coefficients (which determine the probability of staying in state 0) are negative – 
increases in real overvaluation, growth of real domestic credit and the ratio of M2 to reserves should 
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theoretically increase the likelihood of being in State 1 in the next period. For the same reason, the 
expected signs on the δ coefficients (which determine the probability of staying in state 1) are positive. 
 
What do our estimated models say about the two regimes in the hidden Markov chains?  For all four 
countries, one regime is a normal period with zero mean and low volatility in exchange rate percentage 
changes.  The other regime is a financially vulnerable period with positive mean and high volatility in the 
dependent variable.  Forecast probabilities of a vulnerable period given past information are calculated 
from the estimated model.  Such forecast probabilities rise substantially for Malaysia and Thailand in early 
1997 – prior to the “official” start of the Asian crisis in July 1997 – but do not send strong signals for 
Indonesia and the Philippines.  This is a description that is consistent with several analyses of the Asian 
crisis. 
 
For each country, three baseline Markov switching models were estimated: 
 
 Model 1: Markov-switching with constant transition probabilities 
 
Model 2: time-varying transition probabilities that are functions of trend deviations of real 
effective exchange rates   
 
Model 3: time-varying transition probabilities that are functions of trend deviations of real 
effective exchange rates,  percentage changes in money supply (M2) relative to international 
reserves, and percent changes in real domestic credit. 
 
The models are estimated sequentially, partly for comparison purposes but also because each preceding run 
beginning from Model 1 gives us plausible starting estimates for the means and standard deviations when 
the time-varying transition probability models are run.  The estimation results for these baseline models can 
be found in Tables 1, 4, 7 and 10 and are discussed below. 
 
Some of the signs on the estimated coefficients entering the time-varying probabilities were wrongly 
signed.  So for each country, the baseline models were modified by removing those variables with wrongly 
signed coefficients.  The estimations results for these modifications are found in Tables 2, 5, 8 and 11, and 
are also described in the country discussions below.   
 
Indonesia 
 
Of the four countries studied, Indonesia shows the greatest disparity in the behavior of exchange rates in 
State 0 (normal periods) and State 1 (vulnerable periods).  From Table 1 we see that for all three baseline 
models, normal periods are characterized by exchange rate behavior with a low mean (approximately a 
quarter percent average depreciation) and very low volatility (.28), while vulnerable periods are 
characterized by exchange rate behavior with a high mean (average depreciations of 12 percent) as well as 
high volatility (around 22 percent).  A likelihood ratio test of Baseline Model 3 against either Model 1 or 
Model 2 produces chi-square statistics of 2*(213.13-205.41) = 15.44 and 2*(212.53-205.41) = 14.24, 
respectively, which are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, providing support for time-varying 
probabilities dependent on the three indicator variables.  
 
Of the six coefficient estimates for the time-varying transition probabilities in Baseline Model 3, three are 
correctly signed.  The baseline model was thus modified further, by sequentially eliminating wrongly 
signed variables until we obtain the final model, Modification 3. The various modifications explored are 
listed in Table 2.  The final specification, Modification 3, has two exogenous variables entering into the 
transition probability for State 0:  trend deviations of REER, and real domestic credit.  Although the 
coefficient estimates are correctly signed, both are statistically insignificant.  
 
The middle panel in Figure 2 shows which periods the model identifies as vulnerable (State 1) periods.  
Apart from identifying as vulnerable periods the large devaluations/depreciations of the rupiah in 1978, 
1983, 1986 and 1997, the model also identifies two additional periods, in 1984 (a depreciation of 4.6% over 
three months) and at the end of 1990 (a depreciation of 2.5% over two months).  How well does the model 
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anticipate vulnerable periods?  During normal periods, one-period ahead forecast probabilities typically 
stay under 3 percent. Table 3 lists one-period ahead forecast probabilities for our final model, Modification 
3, around the four major depreciation/devaluation episodes in 1978, 1983, 1986 and 1997.  There is little 
movement in forecast probabilities in the months preceding the November 1978 and September 1986 
devaluations.  In the seven months leading up to the April 1983 devaluation of 38 percent, we see some 
activity in the forecast probabilities – forecast probabilities reach 48 percent in October 1982, then taper off 
first to 30 percent and then level of at around 8-10 percent – above the 3 percent average for normal 
periods, but not a very strong signal.  A similar story holds for the months before the August 1997 
depreciation of 11 percent.  Model forecasts go up to 23 percent in December 1996, but then fall to 4-5 
percent levels in the last few months before the crisis.   
 
 
Malaysia 
 
During tranquil periods, the behavior of the Malaysian ringgit is characterized by zero average depreciation 
and a standard deviation of about 1 percent (see Table 4).  Periods of vulnerability show average 
depreciations of two and a half percent, with a volatility of about six percent.  Likelihood ratio tests reject 
the constant transition probability model (Model 1) against both time-varying transition probability models 
at the 5 percent level.  When Model 3 is tested against Model 2, the LR test statistic is significant at the ten 
percent level but not at the five percent level.   
 
Four of the six time-varying transition probability coefficients in Baseline Model 3 are correctly signed.  
When the two wrongly signed variables, trend deviations from REER in State 1 and real domestic credit in 
State 0, are removed (Modification 1 in Table 5), a third variable, M2/Reserves in State 1, also becomes 
wrongly signed.  The final modification, Modification 2, eliminates this variable and we are left with three 
explanatory variables:  trend deviations from REER in State 0, M2/reserves in State 0, and real domestic 
credit in State 1.  All three are correctly signed, and the coefficient on REER in State 0 is statistically 
significant. 
 
Looking at the top left graph in Figure 3, which shows monthly exchange rate changes of the ringgit, it is 
difficult to identify vulnerable periods by an informal “eyeballing”, as the ringgit-dollar exchange rate 
follows a less managed float and fluctuates much more than the exchange rates of the other three countries.  
The only major depreciations that stand out are a 9 percent depreciation in August 1975, and the 1997 
crisis.  The middle panel in Figure 4 shows that both of these periods are identified by the model as 
vulnerable periods.  The models also identify several other  periods of speculative pressure in 1980, 1985 
and 1994 (and smaller blips in 1978 and 1995).   
 
In terms of predictive ability, we find only moderate warnings of vulnerability in the months before the 
August 1975 depreciation (forecast probabilities stay above 10 percent in the four months before the 
deprecation (compared to a tranquil average of about 1 percent).  The model gives stronger warnings in the 
months before the 1997 crisis, with forecast probabilities rising from February 1997 and staying above 30 
percent until the crisis broke. 
 
The Philippines 
 
For the Philippines, the estimates of the baseline models are tabulated in Table 7.  Tranquil periods of 
currency behavior are characterized by average depreciation of one-tenth of one percent and a volatility of a 
third of one percent, while periods of vulnerability are characterized by average monthly depreciations of 2 
percent with a volatility of about five percent.  In models 2 and 3 ( with time-varying transition 
probabilities), none of the indicator variables is statistically significant (based on the t-statistics for the 
estimated coefficients).  Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test statistic has values equal to 2(389.85-389.33) 
= 1.04 for testing model 2 versus model 1; and equal to 2(389.85-388.44) = 2.82 for testing model 3 versus 
model 1.  Thus evidence in support of time-varying transition probabilities that depend on the three 
indicators used is statistically insignificant. 
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Of the six time-varying transition probability coefficients in Baseline Model 3, four are correctly signed.  
When the two wrongly signed variables, M2/Reserves in both State 0 and State 1, are removed, we get our 
final model, Modification 1 which is tabulated in Table 8.  The remaining four variables are correctly 
signed, although none of them is statistically significant. 
 
In Figure 5, the upper left panel – a plot of actual month-to-month percent changes in the peso/dollar rate – 
shows three major depreciation episodes since 1974:  1983-1984 (a depreciation of 24 percent in October 
1983, and again in June of 1984), 1990 (a cumulative depreciation of 20% from July to November), and 
1997-98 (a cumulative depreciation of 50 percent starting in July 1997).  The middle panel of Figure 6 
shows several extended periods that the model identifies as general periods of currency volatility:  1982-86, 
1990-1995, and 1997-98.   
 
In Table 9, the forecast crisis probabilities for our final model, Modification 1, are tabulated for July 1982 
to June 1984 and also for June 1996 to October 1997.  For the 1983-1984 depreciation, the first steep 
devaluation occurred in October 1983;  by January 1983, the forecast probability of a crisis is already over 
80%.  Thus, this event was anticipated earlier by the model.  However, the model failed to anticipate the 
drastic depreciation in June 1984.  It is only in the same month (as the depreciation takes place) that the 
forecast crisis probability rises from less that 10% to over 80%.  Further note how forecast crisis 
probabilities remained high despite the appreciation of the peso in December, 1984-February, 1985 – 
perhaps telling us that we ought to consider three states, instead of two, in the Markov chain in the model. 
 
The lower panel in Table 9 concerns the Asian crisis in 1997.  Just like Thailand, the Philippines suffered 
the effects of the crisis initially in July, 1997, when the peso devalued by 4.9 % and pressures continued for 
the rest of the year.  The three models failed to anticipate the onset of the crisis – the estimated crisis 
probabilities remained low (at 10% - 11%) from January to June and kicked up to 86% only at the crisis 
month itself.   Thus, the three indicator variables used are not helpful at all in flagging whatever problems 
the Philippines had that led to its difficulties in July 1997.  Perhaps then, the fundamentals were okay in the 
Philippines; regional contagion and flight of foreign capital from risks may have been a major factor – 
together with other reasons such as deteriorating exposure of banks to non-performing loans.  Also note 
that the exchange rate regime really was a managed float (even before January 1997) up to July 1997 – thus 
producing data showing an apparently stable currency despite existing latent vulnerability which the model 
is not picking up.  The moral of the analysis is that we need to dig deeper into a wider set of indicator 
variables to explain why the Philippines lapsed into a currency crisis in July 1997. 
 
 
Thailand 
 
Looking at Table 10, Normal periods of exchange rate behavior for the Thai baht are characterized by zero 
average depreciation and very low volatility (.35 percent).  Periods of vulnerability are characterized by 
average depreciations of about two percent, with high volatility (7 percent).  One can reject Models 1 and 2 
in favor of Model 3 using a likelihood ratio test, as the test statistics are significant at the five percent level. 
 
One variable of the six that enter the time-varying transition probability equations is wrongly signed.  
When this variable, M2/Reserves in State 1, is removed (Modification 1), a second variable, REER 
deviations from trend in State 1, also becomes wrongly signed.  We obtain our final model (Modification 2) 
by removing this.  Of the four remaining variables, all are correctly signed but only one, trend deviations of 
REER, is statistically significant. 
 
Exchange rate movements in Thailand are very well-behaved (see Figure 7, top left); long periods of 
relative calm (1974-81, 1981-84, 1985-97) are interrupted by sharp depreciations in July 1981, November 
1984 and July 1997.  These are the crisis episodes that the model identifies (Figure 8, middle panel). 
 
How well does the model anticipate these periods of currency vulnerability?  In the four months 
immediately before the July 1981 depreciation, the model estimates of one-period ahead forecast 
probabilities rise first to 10 percent, to 27% two months later, and finally to 83% in the month just before 
the depreciation (see Table 8).  In the three months before the November 1994 depreciation, the model  
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forecasts crisis probabilities of 16%, 18% and 54%.  What about the 1997 crisis, in which the Thai baht 
was the first victim of speculative attack on July 2?  As early as February 1997, forecast probabilities began 
rising, from 7 percent to 32 percent in the month before the crisis.  Baseline Model 2, with only REER 
deviations from trend as an explanatory variable, gives even stronger warnings;  by April, next-period crisis 
probabilities were above 50% for Model 2, and stayed high until the crisis finally broke.  indicating that 
real exchange rate overvaluation played an important role in Thailand’s 1997 crisis. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Our preliminary results indicate that the Markov switching model is moderately successful at identifying 
currency crisis episodes – with some success in predicting the recent crisis in Thailand and Malaysia – and 
points to future research in various directions. 
 
For all four countries, exchange rate behavior can be categorizedinto two regimes:  one regime is a normal 
period with zero mean and low volatility in exchange rate percentage changes.  The other regime is a 
financially vulnerable period with positive mean and high volatility in the dependent variable.  Real 
exchange rate overvaluation (relative to trend) is an important explanatory variable for predicting a switch 
from normal periods to vulnerable periods;  it is correctly signed for all four countries, and is statistically 
significant in the case of Malaysia and Thailand.  The two other early warning variables explored in this 
paper, growth  in real domestic credit and M2/Reserves, showed only moderate importance, entering into 
the final specifications only in selected countries.  A summary of the variables included in the final 
specifications for each country is summarized below.   
 
COUNTRY EARLY WARNING VARIABLES ENTERING FINAL SPECIFICATION 
Indonesia Real exchange rate, domestic credit 
Malaysia Real exchange rate, M2/Reserves (for State 0 transition probability equation); 
Domestic credit (for State 1 equation) 
Philippines Real exchange rate, domestic credit (for both transition probability equations) 
Thailand Real exchange rate, domestic credit, M2/Reserves (for State 0) 
Domestic credit (for State 1) 
 
The model proves moderately successful at sending warnings of the onset of speculative attacks, but the 
results are not uniform.  For some depreciation episodes, like those in 1981 and 1984 for Thailand as well 
as the 1997 crisis for both Malaysia and Thailand, the model provides strong warning signals, in some 
cases several months in advance.  But for other episodes, such as the 1997 crisis episodes for Indonesia and 
the Philippines, it provides at best only very weak warning signals. 
 
One current limitation on the model is that it relies only on three early warning indicators – the real 
exchange rate, domestic credit and M2/reserves.  The estimated model can be enhanced further through a 
more extensive search for macroeconomic indicators and the use of sector indicators such as the incidence 
of non-performing loans in the banking sector and short-term financial flows and by including explanatory 
variables (xt and lagged yt) in the basic model for yt.  Such modifications may be limited by data 
availability but they can lead to substantial improvement in the forecasting performance of the model. 
 
Technical enrichment of the model also can be done by introducing a third state in the  Markov chain – a 
condition where the currency is strong- and by specifying duration dependence in the transition 
probabilities. 
 
The univariate models covered in our preliminary analysis most likely will behave poorly in forecasting 
macroeconomic variables.  But introducing Markov switching in vector autoregressive (VAR) models of 
macroeconomic variables may enhance the short-term forecasting performance of these models.  Regional 
VAR models with Markov switching  (combining countries into one inter-related model) also provide a 
promising framework for analyzing the contagion effects of a currency crisis.    
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Also, exchange rate fluctuations can be modeled jointly with interest rates and reserves through a Markove 
regime switching VAR model.  This would address the concern that impending currency pressures manifest 
themselves not through the isolated movements in excange rates but rather through a combined profile of 
theses three variables.  In such a VAR model, a specific linear combination of the three variables may be 
constructed as an index of speculative pressure.  Incidence probabilities for a crisis can then be calculated 
from the estimated model as the probability that this index exceeds a predetermined threshold. 
 
Lastly, we note that statistical validation techniques for an unobserved crisis index are nonstandard.  Thus, 
formal validation procedures for assessing the crisis prediction performance of the Markov model must be 
developed.  Future work must also be done to compare the results obtained here with the results obtained 
using earlier approaches such as logit/probit and the signalling approach. 
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 RUN 1:  CONSTANT SWITCHING PROBABILITIES
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT
mu0 0.24 0.02 13.38
mu1 11.90 4.30 2.77
sig0 0.28 0.01 21.42
sig1 22.43 3.04 7.37
coeff on 1, state 0 1.91 0.16 11.60
coeff on 1, state 1 0.69 0.29 2.39
-Log Likelihood: 213.13    
RUN 2:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLE RER
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.23 0.02 13.00
mu1 11.31 4.16 2.72
sig0 0.28 0.02 18.58
sig1 21.99 2.95 7.45
coeff on 1, state 0 2.06 0.27 7.72
coeff on 1, state 1 0.74 0.31 2.34
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.03 0.03 -1.03 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.01 0.02 -0.75 N
-Log Likelihood 212.53    
RUN 3:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLES RER, M2RATIO, DCR
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.23 0.02 13.39
mu1 12.06 4.34 2.78
sig0 0.28 0.01 21.20
sig1 22.52 3.07 7.34
coeff on 1, state 0 2.08 0.23 9.03
coeff on 1, state 1 0.30 0.54 0.56
coeff on RER, state 0 0.01 0.01 0.41 N
coeff on RER, state 1 0.06 0.03 1.97 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 0.001 0.00 0.21 N
coeff on M2RATIO, state 1 -0.05 0.02 -2.64 N
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.01 0.01 -1.51 Y
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.002 0.02 0.10 Y
-Log Likelihood 205.41    
INDONESIA: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Table 1.
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MODIFICATION 1
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.23 0.02 13.19
mu1 10.87 3.96 2.75
sig0 0.28 0.01 19.73
sig1 21.62 2.81 7.69
coeff on 1, state 0 2.28 0.30 7.66
coeff on 1, state 1 1.24 0.58 2.14
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.04 0.03 -1.54 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.02 0.02 -1.16 N
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 0.00 0.00 0.01 N
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.01 0.01 -1.10 Y
coeff on DCR, state 1 -0.02 0.02 -1.09 N
-Log Likelihood: 211.38
MODIFICATION 2
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.23 0.02 13.19
mu1 10.87 3.96 2.74
sig0 0.28 0.01 19.77
sig1 21.62 2.81 7.69
coeff on 1, state 0 2.28 0.30 7.67
coeff on 1, state 1 1.24 0.58 2.14
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.04 0.03 -1.55 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.02 0.02 -1.16 N
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.01 0.01 -1.17 Y
coeff on DCR, state 1 -0.02 0.02 -1.09 N
-Log Likelihood 211.38    
MODIFICATION 3 (FINAL MODEL)
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.23 0.02 13.12
mu1 11.47 4.24 2.71
sig0 0.28 0.01 19.86
sig1 22.13 3.01 7.36
coeff on 1, state 0 2.12 0.29 7.45
coeff on 1, state 1 0.75 0.34 2.23
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.02 0.04 -0.42 Y
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.01 0.01 -0.98 Y
-Log Likelihood 212.32    
Table 2.
INDONESIA: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
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Table 3.
INDONESIA: DEPRECIATION EPISODES
Filtered
 State Estimate: Pr (St=1 | Wt)
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Aug-78 0.00 0.02 0.00
Sep-78 0.00 0.01 0.00
Oct-78 0.00 0.02 0.00
Nov-78 27.60 0.77 1.00
Dec-78 18.03 0.77 1.00
Jan-79 0.00 0.04 0.05
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Sep-82 0.78 0.10 0.01
Oct-82 1.29 0.48 0.57
Nov-82 1.00 0.30 0.30
Dec-82 0.55 0.09 0.01
Jan-83 1.06 0.10 0.07
Feb-83 0.75 0.08 0.01
Mar-83 0.35 0.08 0.00
Apr-83 38.07 0.77 1.00
May-83 -0.11 0.07 0.07
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Jun-86 0.38 0.03 0.00
Jul-86 0.02 0.05 0.00
Aug-86 0.02 0.04 0.00
Sep-86 27.03 0.77 1.00
Oct-86 13.72 0.77 1.00
Nov-86 0.90 0.30 0.39
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Aug-96 0.43 0.03 0.00
Sep-96 -0.61 0.05 0.03
Oct-96 0.00 0.03 0.00
Nov-96 0.17 0.03 0.00
Dec-96 1.27 0.21 0.24
Jan-97 0.64 0.04 0.01
Feb-97 0.42 0.04 0.00
Mar-97 0.45 0.05 0.00
Apr-97 0.54 0.05 0.00
May-97 0.47 0.05 0.00
Jun-97 0.34 0.05 0.00
Jul-97 2.93 0.77 1.00
Aug-97 11.20 0.77 1.00
Sep-97 9.10 0.77 1.00
Oct-97 18.36 0.77 1.00
Nov-97 -3.44 0.77 1.00
Dec-97 40.57 0.77 1.00
Forecast Crisis
Probabilities: Pr (St+1=1 | Wt)
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RUN 1:  CONSTANT SWITCHING PROBABILITIES
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT
mu0 -0.04 0.07 -0.54
mu1 1.83 1.24 1.48
sig0 0.96 0.10 9.56
sig1 5.80 0.98 5.91
coeff on 1, state 0 1.80 0.28 6.52
coeff on 1, state 1 0.60 0.34 1.74
-Log Likelihood: 500.21    
RUN 2:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLE RER
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 -0.05 0.07 -0.75
mu1 2.46 1.30 1.89
sig0 1.03 0.05 18.87
sig1 6.23 0.95 6.54
coeff on 1, state 0 2.31 0.31 7.42
coeff on 1, state 1 0.87 0.34 2.56
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.12 0.05 -2.46 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.03 0.04 -0.73 N
-Log Likelihood 496.93    
RUN 3:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLES RER, M2RATIO, DCR
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 -0.06 0.06 -0.86
mu1 2.57 1.29 2.00
sig0 1.04 0.05 20.26
sig1 6.23 0.94 6.61
coeff on 1, state 0 1.99 0.47 4.22
coeff on 1, state 1 0.44 0.86 0.51
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.21 0.09 -2.31 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.09 0.07 -1.28 N
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.03 0.02 -1.73 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 1 0.03 0.04 0.70 Y
coeff on DCR, state 0 0.07 0.05 1.32 N
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.02 0.05 0.39 Y
-Log Likelihood 494.19
MALAYSIA: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Table 4.
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MODIFICATION 1
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 -0.04 0.07 -0.57
mu1 1.97 1.32 1.49
sig0 0.98 0.09 11.26
sig1 5.90 0.91 6.51
coeff on 1, state 0 2.25 0.44 5.17
coeff on 1, state 1 0.14 0.77 0.18
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.10 0.05 -1.81 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.03 0.01 -1.93 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 1 -0.02 0.02 -0.92 N
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.04 0.04 0.86 Y
-Log Likelihood: 495.92    
MODIFICATION 2 (FINAL MODEL)
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 -0.05 0.07 -0.77
mu1 2.34 1.27 1.85
sig0 1.02 0.06 16.93
sig1 6.12 0.92 6.66
coeff on 1, state 0 2.39 0.38 6.28
coeff on 1, state 1 0.53 0.65 0.82
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.12 0.05 -2.26 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.02 0.01 -1.28 Y
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.02 0.03 0.49 Y
-Log Likelihood 496.16    
MALAYSIA: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Table 5.
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Table 6.
MALAYSIA:  DEPRECIATION EPISODES
Filtered
 State Estimate: Pr (St=1 | Wt)
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Jan-75 -2.14 0.09 0.11
Feb-75 -1.86 0.07 0.06
Mar-75 -1.02 0.06 0.02
Apr-75 1.83 0.13 0.06
May-75 -1.12 0.10 0.04
Jun-75 1.02 0.13 0.03
Jul-75 0.91 0.12 0.04
Aug-75 9.19 0.77 1.00
Sep-75 1.43 0.48 0.61
Oct-75 0.71 0.14 0.16
Nov-75 0.04 0.02 0.02
Dec-75 0.77 0.01 0.00
D% ER Modification 3 Modification 3
Aug-96 0.08 0.07 0.01
Sep-96 0.28 0.05 0.01
Oct-96 0.29 0.07 0.01
Nov-96 0.66 0.08 0.02
Dec-96 0.06 0.06 0.01
Jan-97 -1.36 0.07 0.02
Feb-97 -0.17 0.13 0.01
Mar-97 -0.35 0.22 0.02
Apr-97 0.91 0.32 0.07
May-97 0.21 0.33 0.07
Jun-97 0.43 0.38 0.08
Jul-97 2.25 0.63 0.56
Aug-97 6.62 0.85 1.00
Sep-97 9.82 0.85 1.00
Oct-97 9.24 0.86 1.00
Nov-97 2.84 0.85 0.98
Dec-97 11.31 0.85 1.00
Forecast Crisis
Probabilities: Pr (St+1=1 | Wt)
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RUN 1:  CONSTANT SWITCHING PROBABILITIES
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT
mu0 0.12 0.02 4.88
mu1 2.02 0.53 3.83
sig0 0.32 0.02 14.98
sig1 4.77 0.38 12.53
coeff on 1, state 0 1.43 0.14 10.09
coeff on 1, state 1 0.92 0.19 4.91
-Log Likelihood: 389.85    
RUN 2:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLE RER
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.12 0.02 4.84
mu1 2.03 0.53 3.84
sig0 0.32 0.02 15.23
sig1 4.77 0.38 12.55
coeff on 1, state 0 1.45 0.15 9.94
coeff on 1, state 1 0.94 0.19 4.93
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.02 0.03 -0.78 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 0.01 0.02 0.56 Y
-Log Likelihood 389.33
RUN 3:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLES RER, M2RATIO, DCR
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.12 0.02 4.82
mu1 2.03 0.53 3.85
sig0 0.32 0.02 15.20
sig1 4.77 0.38 12.54
coeff on 1, state 0 1.46 0.16 9.07
coeff on 1, state 1 0.91 0.22 4.22
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.02 0.03 -0.82 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 0.02 0.03 0.60 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 0.003 0.00 0.85 N
coeff on M2RATIO, state 1 -0.001 0.00 -0.26 N
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.57 Y
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.003 0.01 0.51 Y
-Log Likelihood 388.44
Table 7.
PHILIPPINES: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
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MODIFICATION 1 (FINAL MODEL)
Correct Statistically
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign Significant
mu0 0.12 0.02 4.83
mu1 2.03 0.53 3.84
sig0 0.32 0.02 15.26
sig1 4.78 0.38 12.54
coeff on 1, state 0 1.47 0.16 9.33
coeff on 1, state 1 0.89 0.21 4.36
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.02 0.03 -0.81 Y N
coeff on RER, state 1 0.02 0.03 0.79 Y N
coeff on DCR, state 0 -0.003 0.01 -0.48 Y N
coeff on DCR, state 1 0.003 0.01 0.57 Y N
-Log Likelihood: 388.98    
Table 8.
PHILIPPINES: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
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Table 9.
PHILIPPINES:  DEPRECIATION EPISODES
Filtered
 State Estimate: Pr (St=1 | Wt)
D% ER Modification 1 Modification 1
Jul-82 0.44 0.09 0.01
Aug-82 0.49 0.11 0.01
Sep-82 1.27 0.74 0.83
Oct-82 1.49 0.87 1.00
Nov-82 1.24 0.85 0.99
Dec-82 2.08 0.85 1.00
Jan-83 2.51 0.82 1.00
Feb-83 1.92 0.81 1.00
Mar-83 1.49 0.80 1.00
Apr-83 2.74 0.80 1.00
May-83 1.64 0.79 1.00
Jun-83 3.52 0.76 1.00
Jul-83 5.94 0.75 1.00
Aug-83 0.00 0.17 0.17
Sep-83 0.00 0.06 0.01
Oct-83 24.54 0.78 1.00
Nov-83 2.19 0.69 1.00
Dec-83 0.00 0.13 0.13
Jan-84 0.00 0.07 0.01
Feb-84 0.00 0.07 0.00
Mar-84 0.00 0.07 0.01
Apr-84 0.00 0.07 0.01
May-84 0.00 0.07 0.00
Jun-84 24.28 0.84 1.00
D% ER Modification 1 Modification 1
Jun-96 0.07 0.10 0.01
Jul-96 0.02 0.11 0.01
Aug-96 0.00 0.11 0.01
Sep-96 0.14 0.12 0.01
Oct-96 0.13 0.12 0.01
Nov-96 -0.01 0.11 0.01
Dec-96 0.10 0.10 0.01
Jan-97 0.09 0.12 0.01
Feb-97 0.09 0.13 0.01
Mar-97 -0.03 0.13 0.01
Apr-97 0.12 0.13 0.01
May-97 0.03 0.13 0.01
Jun-97 0.02 0.12 0.01
Jul-97 4.90 0.88 1.00
Aug-97 6.01 0.86 1.00
Sep-97 10.45 0.84 1.00
Oct-97 6.39 0.81 1.00
Probabilities: Pr (St+1=1 | Wt)
Forecast Crisis
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RUN 1:  CONSTANT SWITCHING PROBABILITIES
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT
mu0 0.00 0.02 -0.06
mu1 2.48 1.30 1.90
sig0 0.35 0.02 22.47
sig1 7.27 0.93 7.83
coeff on 1, state 0 2.24 0.22 10.06
coeff on 1, state 1 1.43 0.37 3.88
-Log Likelihood: 229.89    
RUN 2:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLE RER
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.00 0.02 -0.01
mu1 2.46 1.30 1.90
sig0 0.35 0.02 22.95
sig1 7.26 0.92 7.91
coeff on 1, state 0 5.00 2.00 2.50
coeff on 1, state 1 1.54 0.40 3.85
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.42 0.20 -2.10 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.06 0.06 -1.01 N
-Log Likelihood 219.10    
RUN 3:  EXOGENOUS VARIABLES RER, M2RATIO, DCR
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.00 0.02 -0.03
mu1 1.74 1.27 1.37
sig0 0.35 0.02 23.03
sig1 6.99 0.83 8.37
coeff on 1, state 0 7.99 4.25 1.88
coeff on 1, state 1 -1.36 16.65 -0.08
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.54 0.37 -1.46 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 2.09 5.76 0.36 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.05 0.04 -1.36 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 1 -0.76 4.36 -0.17 N
coeff on RDC, state 0 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 Y
coeff on RDC, state 1 2.80 20.66 0.14 Y
-Log Likelihood 209.17
THAILAND: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Table 10.
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MODIFICATION 1
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.00 0.02 -0.01
mu1 2.24 1.32 1.69
sig0 0.35 0.02 23.00
sig1 7.37 0.95 7.76
coeff on 1, state 0 10.12 6.01 1.68
coeff on 1, state 1 0.69 0.96 0.72
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.68 0.47 -1.44 Y
coeff on RER, state 1 -0.09 0.10 -0.82 N
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.07 0.06 -1.16 Y
coeff on RDC, state 0 -0.01 0.12 -0.12 Y
coeff on RDC, state 1 0.08 0.10 0.82 Y
-Log Likelihood: 214.41    
MODIFICATION 2 (FINAL MODEL)
Correct
DESCRIPTION COEFF SE T-STAT Sign
mu0 0.00 0.02 -0.02
mu1 3.37 1.23 2.73
sig0 0.35 0.02 23.00
sig1 6.77 0.78 8.73
coeff on 1, state 0 4.19 1.33 3.15
coeff on 1, state 1 0.99 0.85 1.17
coeff on RER, state 0 -0.24 0.11 -2.06 Y
coeff on M2RATIO, state 0 -0.03 0.02 -1.67 Y
coeff on RDC, state 0 -0.01 0.05 -0.21 Y
coeff on RDC, state 1 0.05 0.07 0.76 Y
-Log Likelihood 217.62    
THAILAND: ESTIMATES OF REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Table 11.
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Table 12.
THAILAND:  DEPRECIATION EPISODES
Filtered 
 State Estimate: Pr (St=1 | Ωt)
∆% ER Modification 2 Modification 2
Jan-81 0.25 0.00 0.00
Feb-81 0.03 0.00 0.00
Mar-81 -0.02 0.10 0.00
Apr-81 0.32 0.05 0.01
May-81 0.96 0.27 0.10
Jun-81 0.29 0.83 0.02
Jul-81 5.44 0.96 1.00
Aug-81 3.87 0.96 1.00
Sep-81 0.00 0.48 0.50
∆% ER Modification 2 Modification 2
Jan-84 0.00 0.01 0.00
Feb-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mar-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Apr-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
May-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jun-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jul-84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aug-84 0.00 0.16 0.00
Sep-84 0.00 0.18 0.01
Oct-84 0.00 0.54 0.01
Nov-84 15.56 0.98 1.00
Dec-84 1.94 0.98 1.00
∆% ER Modification 2 Modification 2
Jul-96 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Aug-96 -0.27 0.00 0.00
Sep-96 0.35 0.00 0.00
Oct-96 0.38 0.00 0.00
Nov-96 -0.04 0.01 0.00
Dec-96 0.41 0.01 0.00
Jan-97 0.60 0.02 0.00
Feb-97 0.86 0.07 0.02
Mar-97 0.07 0.10 0.00
Apr-97 0.40 0.16 0.01
May-97 -0.70 0.25 0.06
Jun-97 -0.35 0.32 0.02
Jul-97 17.62 0.97 1.00
Aug-97 7.13 0.99 1.00
Sep-97 11.76 0.99 1.00
Oct-97 3.01 0.98 1.00
Nov-97 5.10 0.99 1.00
Dec-97 15.23 0.98 1.00
Probabilities: Pr (St+1=1 | Ωt)
Forecast Crisis
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